尚硅谷 硅谷新聞

By Katharine Schwab

凱瑟琳·施瓦布(Katharine Schwab)

For as long as it has existed, people have been trying to replicate the magic of Silicon Valley, to capture some of its ineffable ability to produce true innovation — inventions that have changed many people’s lives for the better. But despite its real claim to innovation, Silicon Valley has also come to represent something less tangible. Andrew Russell, professor of history and dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at SUNY Polytechnic Institute, and Lee Vinsel, a professor in the Department of Science, Technology, and Society at Virginia Tech, call it “innovation speak.”

只要它存在，人們就一直在嘗試復制硅谷的魔力，以捕捉其產生真正創新的不可言喻的能力-發明改變了許多人的生活。 但是，盡管硅谷真正宣稱要創新，但它也已經代表了不那么實際的東西。 紐約州立大學理工學院的歷史學教授兼藝術與科學學院院長安德魯·羅素(Andrew Russell)和弗吉尼亞理工大學科學，技術與社會學系教授Lee Vinsel稱其為“創新演講”。

The two are the author of a new book, called The Innovation Delusion, that explores the deep problems with the Silicon Valley-inspired mindset that shiny new things can solve all of society’s problems. Instead, Russell and Vinsel advocate for what they call a “maintenance mindset,” which focuses on keeping the technology we already have up and running rather than always looking for the next new thing. Russell and Vinsel run a research network and conference series called the Maintainers, which focuses on values of upkeep, repair, and sustainable labor.

這兩人是一本名為《創新妄想》的新書的作者，該書探討了硅谷啟發的思維方式的深層問題，即閃亮的新事物可以解決社會所有問題。 相反，拉塞爾(Russell)和文塞爾(Vinsel)倡導他們所謂的“維護思維方式”，該思維方式著眼于保持我們已經擁有并運行的技術，而不是總是尋找下一個新事物。 羅素(Russell)和文塞爾(Vinsel)主持了一個名為“維護者(Maintainers)”的研究網絡和會議系列，其重點是維護，維修和可持續勞動的價值。

While Russell and Vinsel believe that we need a place in culture for people to take risks and try new things, they see danger in exporting a fail-fast mentality to places that aren’t suited for it, such as government, traditional businesses, and infrastructure. In those areas, they argue that the aspiration to innovate is simply a delusion.

盡管羅素(Russell)和文塞爾(Vinsel)認為我們需要在文化中占有一席之地，以便人們承擔風險并嘗試新事物，但他們認為將失敗快速的心態輸出到不適合它的地方(例如政府，傳統企業和基礎設施。 他們認為，在那些領域中，創新的愿望只是一種幻想。

The following interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.

為了簡潔和清楚起見，以下采訪已經過編輯。

Fast Company: What is the innovation delusion and how do you think it’s impacting society right now?

Fast Company：什么是創新錯覺？您認為它現在如何影響社會？

Andrew Russell: The innovation delusion is the mistaken notion that the creation of new things, cloaked in the buzzwords of innovation, are the best and only path to resolve all kinds of problems that we face in society, from our personal lives to our businesses or universities to infrastructure at large.

安德魯·拉塞爾(Andrew Russell)：創新妄想是一種錯誤的觀念，即以創新術語籠罩的新事物的創造是解決我們從個人生活到企業或社會的各種社會問題的最佳且唯一的途徑大學到整個基礎設施。

Lee Vinsel: We like to make a distinction between what we call actual innovation and what we call innovation-speak, and innovation-speak is this way of thinking and talking about technological and business change that’s developed in the last 50 years or so. There’s two problems. The first is that it doesn’t produce results, necessarily. We’re talking more and more about innovation, but there’s no evidence that there is more and more innovation. And meanwhile, it also distracts us from really crucial things in our culture, including just the work of keeping things going and the people who do that work.

Lee Vinsel：我們希望在所謂的實際創新和所謂的創新口語之間進行區分，而創新口語就是這種思考和談論近50年來發展的技術和業務變化的方式。 有兩個問題。 首先是它不一定會產生結果。 我們越來越多地談論創新，但是沒有證據表明有越來越多的創新。 同時，這也分散了我們對我們文化中真正重要的事情的注意力，包括僅使事情繼續進行的工作以及從事這項工作的人員。

FC: So this talk about innovation versus the actual practice of innovation — why is it important to differentiate between those two, and how did that distinction get collapsed?

FC：所以這是關于創新與實際創新的討論-為什么區分這兩者很重要，并且這種區分是如何崩潰的？

LV: I think the reality is that the way we’ve come to talk about innovation and technological change is a theory of society that was developed by economists and business-school thinkers and consultants since the post-World War II period. I think if we don’t make that distinction, we just take it as natural that there’s some kind of tight alignment between the talk and the thing.

LV：我認為現實是，我們談論創新和技術變革的方式是自二戰后由經濟學家，商學院思想家和顧問開發的一種社會理論。 我認為，如果我們不進行區分，那么我們自然會認為談話與事物之間存在某種緊密的聯系。

AR: One reason why innovation-speak has become so prominent is in part a product of technological change and actual innovation being so successful and having such an outsized impact on people’s lives. The examples that we like to use include medicine, whether it’s things like vaccines or a nonpharmaceutical intervention — standards of cleanliness in the hospitals that are a century old. Innovations or inventions in technology as well, whether it’s electric power, internal combustion engines, airplanes, digital technologies closer to the present — those things have made measurable impacts on people’s lives and society and the national global economy. But it’s easy also to overstate those things and then just to extrapolate on those positive examples and to say, we have a template for what we should do in all times and places.

AR：講創新之所以變得如此突出的一個原因，部分原因是技術變革和實際創新如此成功，并對人們的生活產生了巨大影響。 我們喜歡使用的示例包括藥物，無論是疫苗還是非藥物干預手段，這些都是百年歷史的醫院的清潔標準。 技術方面的創新或發明，無論是電力，內燃機，飛機，更接近當今的數字技術，這些東西都對人們的生活和社會以及全球國民經濟產生了可觀的影響。 但是也很容易夸大這些事情，然后僅僅推斷那些積極的例子，并且說，我們有一個模板，可以隨時隨地做什么。

硅谷現象 (A Silicon Valley Phenomenon)

FC: Where does Silicon Valley fit into this, both on the real innovation side and on the innovation-speak side?

FC：無論是在真正的創新方面還是在創新方面，硅谷都適合于此？

LV: I think innovation-speak — this way of talking — really heats up in the ’70s and ’80s. Silicon Valley sits both at the hub of actual innovation and innovation-speak. When people start writing books about Silicon Valley in the late 1970s and early ’80s, it’s basically like how-to manuals for local planners to recreate Silicon Valley, because there is so much economic growth and technological change happening there. It’s seen as the bright thing that we should all emulate. And it’s everywhere from the Midwest to New York City with Silicon Alley to Australia with Kangaroo Valley — everyone wants to recreate Silicon Valley.

LV：我認為講創新的方式實際上是在70年代和80年代升溫的。 硅谷既是實際創新的中心，也是創新的中心。 當人們在1970年代末和80年代初開始撰寫有關硅谷的書籍時，基本上就像當地規劃師如何重新創建硅谷的使用手冊，因為那里發生了太多的經濟增長和技術變革。 這被認為是我們所有人都應該效仿的美好事物。 從中西部到擁有硅谷的紐約到擁有袋鼠谷的澳大利亞，到處都是-每個人都想重建硅谷。

On the other hand, there’s always been so much hype around digital technology. The technology has never actually lived up to the hype to the degree that Silicon Valley now is the place where all these new ventures are constantly producing hype about the potentials of their technology. And that’s often couched in terms of innovation. I have a friend who works at Bloomberg news — every press release they get from companies talk about how innovative the company is, you know? So I think that Silicon Valley is beautifully at the center of both actual innovation and this way of talking.

另一方面，圍繞數字技術的炒作總是如此。 實際上，這項技術從未像現在這樣大肆宣傳，以致于硅谷現在是所有這些新創企業不斷對其技術潛力進行大肆宣傳的地方。 在創新方面，這通常很重要。 我有一個朋友在彭博新聞社工作-他們從公司獲得的每份新聞稿都談到公司的創新能力，您知道嗎？ 因此，我認為硅谷是實際創新和這種交談方式的中心。

AR: There’s an element of these emulation manuals or the attempt to replicate the special sauce or the secret sauce as people say about Silicon Valley — there’s some huge holes in those stories. We’re trained as historians, and we’re trained on the tradition that looks at technological systems holistically, whether it’s trains or computers or software. The emulation manuals about how to make your own Silicon Valley usually leave out the unsavory aspects of Silicon Valley and the actual keys to its success, which include massive federal subsidies, massive amounts of undocumented labor, huge disparities between the haves and the have-nots, irreversible environmental damage, the list goes on and on. Scholars have written about this. That work tends to get dismissed by people who were looking to get funding or just mobilize people around this vision of just getting the good and not reckoning with the costs.

AR：這些仿真手冊中有一些內容，或者像人們對硅谷所說的那樣，試圖復制特殊的調味料或秘密調味料-這些故事中有很多漏洞。 我們接受過歷史學家的培訓，我們接受了從整體上看待技術系統(無論是火車，計算機還是軟件)的傳統培訓。 關于如何創建自己的硅谷的仿真手冊通常忽略了硅谷的不利方面及其成功的關鍵，其中包括大量的聯邦補貼，大量的無證勞動力，貧富之間的巨大差異。 ，不可逆轉的環境破壞，這個清單還在不斷。 學者們已經寫過關于這一點。 那些希望獲得資金或只是動員人們追求僅獲得利益而不考慮成本的愿景的人往往會駁回這項工作。

FC: The book is framed around two visions. On one side, there are these values of “innovation” and progress and growth. And then on the other side, there’s this other core value of maintenance and the maintenance mindset. Can you talk to me about how these two buckets work in opposition to each other, in particular around growth and the cost of growth?

FC：這本書圍繞著兩種愿景。 一方面，存在著“創新”，進步與成長的價值觀。 另一方面，還有維護的另一個核心價值和維護思想。 您能和我談談這兩個桶是如何相互對立的，特別是圍繞增長和增長成本嗎？

LV: Part of the reason that distinction between actual innovation and innovation-speak is so important to us is because we’re not Luddites. We like our fancy new gadgets, and we like technological progress. But we are trying to rebalance the way we think about these things. As we build out these modern systems, whether it’s electricity or the internet, or all of the businesses we built on top of the internet, like Amazon Web Services, those are all things that we have to then keep up if we want to keep that quality of life. I think if we focus too much on the shiny new thing, and in that introduction of new stuff, we can easily overlook that important labor.

LV：真正的創新和講創新的區別對我們如此重要的部分原因是因為我們不是Luddites。 我們喜歡花哨的新產品，也喜歡技術進步。 但是，我們正在嘗試重新平衡思考這些事情的方式。 當我們構建這些現代系統時，無論是電力還是互聯網，還是我們在互聯網之上構建的所有業務(如Amazon Web Services)，如果要保持這些功能，我們都必須保持這些。生活質量。 我認為，如果我們過多地關注閃亮的新事物，并且在引入新事物時，我們很容易忽略了這一重要工作。

AR: It’s not an either/or but can be a both/and. Some of the firms we’ve interviewed and the people we talked to who work in maintenance really rely on new technologies or innovative approaches, whether it’s using artificial intelligence and predictive analytics and the internet of things — all these terms that are buzzwords if they’re not in context. But they use them for a particular purpose, which is to keep systems going. There can be a kind of resolution between these two concepts. Innovation and maintenance don’t have to be opposites. They can work together. But what’s needed is to take a step back and think about how they can work together instead of just putting blind faith in the shiny object. And then if that happens to the detriment of everything else, that’s where the problems appear. That’s when you see bridges collapsing, that’s when you see schools or organizations falling apart due to inattention of the basics — not the new stuff, but the basics that keep things going.

AR：它不是一個或非，但可以是一個/非。 我們采訪過的一些公司以及與維修工作人員交談過的人實際上都依賴于新技術或創新方法，無論它是使用人工智能，預測分析和物聯網，否則所有這些術語都是流行詞??。不在上下文中。 但是他們將它們用于特定目的，即保持系統正常運行。 這兩個概念之間可能存在一種解決方案。 創新和維護不一定是對立的。 他們可以一起工作。 但是，我們需要退后一步，思考一下它們如何協同工作，而不是僅僅對發光的物體抱有盲目的信念。 然后，如果那一切損害了其他一切，那就是問題所在。 那是當您看到橋梁倒塌時，那是當您看到學校或組織由于基礎知識的疏忽而瓦解時，這些基礎知識不是新事物，而是使事情持續發展的基礎知識。

通過激勵建立的系統 (A System Built Through Incentives)

FC: To your point around how these two pieces can work together, the Silicon Valley software giants, Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc., are actually really good at maintenance. A lot of what they do is just to keep their services running and reliable. But you also highlight some of these companies’ problems with growth and focus on always coming up with something new. How do you square these two? Obviously these companies are huge and so, you know, they contain multitudes. Some of these companies that maybe are the hallmark of the kinds of downsides you were just describing are also really good at maintenance.

FC：關于這兩個部分如何協同工作的觀點，硅谷軟件巨頭Google，Facebook，Amazon等實際上非常擅長維護。 他們所做的很多事情只是保持他們的服務運行和可靠。 但是，您也要強調其中一些公司的成長問題，并專注于始終提出新的想法。 您如何平方這兩個？ 顯然，這些公司規模巨大，所以您知道它們包含很多。 這些公司中有些可能只是您剛才描述的缺點的標志，它們在維護方面也很出色。

AR: They have incentives to behave the way that they’re behaving. I think that’s a big part of the problem. So they have quarterly earnings reports that traditionally have been really the yardstick for how they perform. There’s been some pushback about using quarterly earnings reports in that way. Those companies have used a playbook that really features new stuff, new stuff, new stuff all the time. I think if they felt that it was a better strategy to attract investment through showing off their good maintenance practices, they would be doing more of that, but the incentives are skewed. I think they’re responding somewhat in a rational sense to the incentives that they have in front of them.

AR：他們有動機去表現自己的行為方式。 我認為這是問題的很大一部分。 因此，他們擁有季度收益報告，這些報告傳統上一直是衡量其業績的標準。 以這種方式使用季度收益報告存在一些退縮。 這些公司使用的劇本一直都在以新內容，新內容和新內容為特色。 我認為，如果他們認為通過炫耀其良好的維護習慣來吸引投資是一種更好的策略，他們會做更多的事情，但是激勵措施卻存在偏差。 我認為他們在某種程度上對他們面前的激勵措施做出了合理的回應。

LV: I think your own point about the fact that these are enormous entities at this point is right on. The most profitable part of Amazon for a long time has been Amazon Web Services, right? That’s a maintenance practice. They’re competing on uptime and quality of service. I’ve met a lot of Amazon engineers that are just keeping the ship up, on track, and afloat. But that’s very different than the image we have of Bezos and him being into space and roboticized warehouses and all these things. When you get these very large companies in that way, there’s the upper end, where people are focusing just on the new stuff. And then most of how they’re making money is on these very boring processes.

LV：我認為關于這一點的事實您是正確的。 長期以來，亞馬遜最賺錢的部分是亞馬遜網絡服務，對嗎？ 那是維護習慣。 他們在正常運行時間和服務質量方面進行競爭。 我遇到了很多亞馬遜工程師，他們只是在保持運輸，跟蹤和浮動。 但這與貝索斯(Bezos)和他進入太空，機械化倉庫以及所有這些東西的印象完全不同。 當您以這種方式獲得這些非常大的公司時，就會出現高端產品，而人們只會專注于新產品。 然后，他們大部分的賺錢方式都是在這些非常無聊的過程中進行的。

That’s very different than the startup world. If all you’re doing is trying to create something that you can sell to one of these companies, you have very little incentive to think through the long-term costs or even the maintenance costs of the thing you’re trying to develop. So it’s how these different-sized entities are reacting to incentives.

那與初創公司世界大不相同。 如果您所做的只是嘗試創建可以出售給其中一家公司的產品，那么您幾乎沒有動力去考慮您要開發的產品的長期成本甚至維護成本。 這就是這些不同規模的實體對激勵措施的React。

出口創業文化的風險 (The Risks of Exporting Startup Culture)

FC: So this is really fundamentally about changing incentives. What is a better way of thinking about incentives for a new company, or someone with what they think is a brilliant idea? There’s the incentive of changing the world, which is cliché and overwrought at this point. There’s being bought by a giant. And I guess there’s growth. How does long-term thinking play into that from a more practical perspective?

FC：所以這實際上是從根本上改變激勵機制。 有什么更好的方法來考慮對新公司或某人的激勵措施？ 有改變世界的動機，這是陳詞濫調和過度努力的。 被一個巨人買了。 而且我想還有增長。 從更實際的角度來看，長期思考如何發揮作用？

LV: I’m actually okay with like the startup world being the startup world. I don’t necessarily want to change that. That’s okay by me that you have this space of like high risk, high reward, people trying out new things.

LV：我真的可以接受像創業世界這樣的創業世界。 我不一定要更改它。 對我而言，您可以擁有這樣的空間，例如高風險，高回報，人們嘗試新事物。

AR: I agree with Lee that the startup world is going to be the startup world and changing that incentive structure is not what we’re trying to do here. But what we do try and point out in the book is to ask people to answer for themselves the question of what do they find to be valuable and what do they want to preserve. If I was to coach an entrepreneur, someone making a startup, I think the question for the past generation or so has been, what do you want to disrupt? You could imagine a different way of asking the question: What do you want to preserve? It feels like there’s some space there in the goals of people doing startups to ask questions a different way and to try and provide some value for people in different ways.

AR：我同意Lee的觀點，即創業世界將成為創業世界，改變這種激勵結構并不是我們在此要做的。 但是我們在書中試圖指出的是要求人們自己回答以下問題：他們認為有價值的東西是什么，想要保存什么。 如果我要指導企業家，創業者，我認為過去一代左右的問題是，您想破壞什么？ 您可以想象出一種不同的詢問方式：您想保留什么？ 感覺人們在創業公司的目標中有一定的空間，可以以不同的方式提出問題并嘗試以不同的方式為人們提供價值。

LV: It’s more of when we start to model other parts of our culture — whether it’s General Electric or universities or government, when you start to model all these other parts of our culture on Silicon Valley startup culture, that’s where we really are running a risk. GE tried to model itself on Silicon Valley startups? That is just delusion in the deepest way. But two years later, their stock was in the garbage and it didn’t work at all. I think that with design thinking and all these things where we’re all supposed to be like Silicon Valley startups, that’s the risk. The risk to the broader culture is that we all think we’re supposed to be like a bunch of 20-year-olds living on pizza who are going to burn out in a couple months.

LV：更多的是我們開始對文化的其他部分建模(無論是通用電氣，大學還是政府)，當您開始在硅谷創業文化中對文化的所有其他部分進行建模時，我們才真正在這里開展業務。風險。 GE試圖以硅谷的初創公司為模型嗎？ 這只是最深層的幻想。 但是兩年后，他們的存貨被浪費了，根本沒有用。 我認為，以設計思維以及所有這些我們都應該像硅谷初創公司一樣的方式，這就是風險。 對更廣泛文化的風險在于，我們所有人都認為我們應該像一群生活在披薩上的20歲年輕人，他們將在幾個月內燒光。

AR: I think what we want to do is to give [companies like GE] an out in a way, and to say, we really need to pay more attention to the things that people have taken for granted, to long-term strategies. We shouldn’t be distracted by the allure of being what GE tried to call itself: the 124-year-old software startup. We should just recognize that it doesn’t feel right because it’s not right. And it’s okay to just be 124 years old and make really good products and pay attention to the basics and reward and compensate the managers and the staff in the company that create experiences or products that people can rely on. Our book is really trying to make that case, not only for a company like GE, but to say, we understand, we all understand intuitively that [maintenance] is desirable. We exercise or we try and eat right. We try and keep up with our gadgets and our stuff around our houses, because we understand that maintenance and upkeep are important. So let’s just extend that knowledge into other walks of life that are, as we try and show, a little out of bounds and skew too much towards this delusion that new stuff and innovation will just save our bacon.

AR：我認為我們要做的是以某種方式給予[GE等公司]一席之地，也就是說，我們確實需要更多地關注人們認為理所當然的事情以及長期戰略。 通用電氣試圖稱呼自己的魅力不會讓我們分心：這家擁有124年歷史的軟件初創公司。 我們應該只認識到感覺不對，因為它不對。 并且只有124歲的年齡，可以制造出真正好的產品，并注意基礎知識，并獎勵和獎勵公司中創造出人們可以依靠的經驗或產品的管理人員和員工，這是可以的。 我們的書實際上是在試圖使這種情況發生，不僅對于像GE這樣的公司，而且要說，我們理解，我們都直觀地理解[維護]是可取的。 我們鍛煉身體或嘗試正確飲食。 我們努力與房子周圍的小工具和東西保持同步，因為我們知道維護和保養很重要。 因此，讓我們將這些知識擴展到其他領域，正如我們嘗試和展示的那樣，這些領域有些超出界限，并且偏向于這種錯覺，以至于新事物和創新只會節省我們的培根。

尋找平衡 (Finding Balance)

FC: You’ve said that some things are out of balance and skewed toward this delusion. What pushes us back into balance? Is it regulation? You write in the book that the champions of innovation really don’t want to be regulated, and their primary reason is that it will stamp out innovation. What role do you see regulation playing, particularly within Silicon Valley innovation-speak-land, and with the big tech companies where it’s primarily focused right now?

FC：您已經說過有些事情不平衡，并且傾向于這種錯覺。 是什么促使我們恢復平衡？ 是規定嗎？ 您在書中寫道，創新的擁護者真的不想受到監管，其主要原因是創新會淘汰創新。 您如何看待法規的作用，特別是在硅谷的創新之地以及目前主要關注的大型科技公司中？

AR: Regulation is an expression of what the society deems valuable. With companies, typically regulations have been especially effective in trying to force companies to reckon with externalities, things that they just don’t have to deal with. So pollution is the classical example, but there’s others, like safety. I think we’re not the only ones pointing at some of the cultural damage and societal damage. That’s what you see when you see these guys marched onto Capitol Hill. People are increasingly concerned about those aspects of social media companies, misinformation, all that good stuff. We get the regulation we vote for in a sense. That’s how the system works. It’s kind of a checks and balances in my view. In the last generation, the way it’s been set up is to let the private sector rip and then deal with problems afterwards. I think we’re in a moment where that is being called into question. How much state and federal regulators and international regulators change that mode of operation is kind of an unanswered question right now.

AR：監管是社會認為有價值的一種表達。 對于公司而言，法規通常在試圖迫使公司考慮外部性時特別有效，而外部性只是他們不必處理的事情。 因此，污染是典型的例子，但還有其他一些例子，例如安全性。 我認為我們并不是唯一指出某些文化破壞和社會破壞的人。 當您看到這些家伙踏上國會山時，便會看到這些。 人們越來越關注社交媒體公司的那些方面，錯誤的信息以及所有這些好東西。 在某種意義上，我們得到了我們投票支持的法規。 這就是系統的工作方式。 在我看來，這是一種制衡。 在上一代中，它的設置方式是讓私營部門撕裂，然后再處理問題。 我認為我們正在對此提出質疑。 目前有多少州和聯邦監管機構以及國際監管機構改變這種運作方式，這是一個尚未回答的問題。

LV: I think the other structure is financial. There’s been a lot of chatter about what’s called shareholder value, which is a philosophy that was developed in the ’80s. It becomes a financial incentive in a lot of ways, which is just to maximize the value for stockholders on a quarterly basis. That’s all about growth, right? It’s all about the rush for growth. This is something too that’s being questioned. The Business Roundtable of all places came out and said, “This is not sustainable. This doesn’t work for society.” I think that’s the kind of stuff that has to change. If you can take your foot off the gas a little bit and stop worrying about growth, growth, growth, growth, then you can have some more long-term thinking about what you need to do to sustain things environmentally as well as organizationally. You can also start to reward those people who are doing that sustaining work and not just focus on the bright shiny innovators within the company all the time.

LV：我認為另一種結構是財務。 關于所謂的股東價值的討論很多，這是80年代發展起來的一種哲學。 它在許多方面成為一種財務激勵措施，只是在每個季度使股東的價值最大化。 這就是增長的全部，對不對？ 一切都是為了增長。 這也是受到質疑的東西。 所有地方的商業圓桌會議都出來了，并說 ：“這是不可持續的。 這對社會不起作用。” 我認為那是必須改變的東西。 如果您可以稍稍放開腳步，不再擔心增長，增長，增長，增長，那么您可以對需要采取哪些措施進行長期思考，以實現環境和組織方面的可持續發展。 您也可以開始獎勵那些從事這項持續工作的人，而不僅僅是一直專注于公司內部有才華的創新者。

翻譯自: https://medium.com/fast-company/how-silicon-valley-turned-true-innovation-into-an-overhyped-delusion-e5b0075f9a45

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