XXE漏洞需要您在回調(diào)處理代碼里面解析XML之前，加入禁用實(shí)體解析的代碼，不同語(yǔ)言設(shè)置的內(nèi)容不同，下面提供了幾種主流開(kāi)發(fā)語(yǔ)言的設(shè)置指引(您可以根據(jù)關(guān)鍵字找到xml解析組件采取對(duì)應(yīng)方法升級(jí))：

【PHP】 解析XML代碼前加入：

libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);//關(guān)鍵代碼

$xml = simplexml_load_string($xmlContent);

......

【JAVA】

import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;

import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException; // catching unsupported features

DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();

String FEATURE = null;

try {

// This is the PRIMARY defense. If DTDs (doctypes) are disallowed, almost all XML entity attacks are prevented

// Xerces 2 only - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/features.html#disallow-doctype-decl

FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, true);

// If you can't completely disable DTDs, then at least do the following:

// Xerces 1 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces-j/features.html#external-general-entities

// Xerces 2 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/features.html#external-general-entities

// JDK7+ - http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities

FEATURE = "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);

// Xerces 1 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces-j/features.html#external-parameter-entities

// Xerces 2 - http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/features.html#external-parameter-entities

// JDK7+ - http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities

FEATURE = "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);

// Disable external DTDs as well

FEATURE = "http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);

// and these as well, per Timothy Morgan's 2014 paper: "XML Schema, DTD, and Entity Attacks"

dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);

dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);

// And, per Timothy Morgan: "If for some reason support for inline DOCTYPEs are a requirement, then

// ensure the entity settings are disabled (as shown above) and beware that SSRF attacks

// (http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html) and denial

// of service attacks (such as billion laughs or decompression bombs via "jar:") are a risk."

// remaining parser logic

} catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {

// This should catch a failed setFeature feature

logger.info("ParserConfigurationException was thrown. The feature '" +

FEATURE + "' is probably not supported by your XML processor.");

}

catch (SAXException e) {

// On Apache, this should be thrown when disallowing DOCTYPE

logger.warning("A DOCTYPE was passed into the XML document");

}

catch (IOException e) {

// XXE that points to a file that doesn't exist

logger.error("IOException occurred, XXE may still possible: " + e.getMessage());

}

DocumentBuilder safebuilder = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();

【.Net】

XmlDocument doc= new XmlDocument();

doc.XmlResolver = null;//關(guān)鍵代碼

......

【ASP】

Set xmldom = Server.CreateObject("MSXML2.DOMDocument")

xmldom.resolveExternals = false '關(guān)鍵代碼

......

【Python】

from?lxml?import?etree

xmlData?=?etree.parse(xmlSource,etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))

......

【c/c++(常用庫(kù)為libxml2?libxerces-c)】 【libxml2】: 確保關(guān)閉配置選項(xiàng)：XML_PARSE_NOENT?和?XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD

2.9版本以上已修復(fù)XXE

【Coldfusion/lucee和node.js】

請(qǐng)更新到庫(kù)的最新版本

【libxerces-c】：

如果用的是XercesDOMParser:

XercesDOMParser?*parser?=?new?XercesDOMParser;

parser->setCreateEntityReferenceNodes(false);

如果是用SAXParser:

SAXParser*?parser?=?new?SAXParser;

parser->setDisableDefaultEntityResolution(true);

如果是用SAX2XMLReader:

SAX2XMLReader*?reader?=?XMLReaderFactory::createXMLReader();

parser->setFeature(XMLUni::fgXercesDisableDefaultEntityResolution,?true);

附錄：更多開(kāi)源庫(kù)/語(yǔ)言版本的修復(fù)建議可參考：

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#C.2FC.2B.2B

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